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Burchell1 explains that mental illness may deprive persons of the capacity to appreciate 
the unlawfulness of their conduct. It may also deprive them of the capacity to control 
their conduct. Persons who suffers from a mental illness that has such an effect is said 
(in legal terms) not to be accountable due to their mental illness. The mentally ill, 
however, are a distinct subgroup within the penal system.2 The underlying premise of 
the defence of mental illness is that persons with mental illness are the victims of an 
affliction that causes them to behave in an abnormal manner due to their mental 
illness. They cannot be blamed for their conduct while afflicted by the illness as they 
lack criminal capacity, or their capacity is diminished. The test for capacity is entirely 
subjective,3 relating for example to the capacity of the particular accused person who 
is alleged to be mentally ill. This note discusses the concept of forensic psychiatry, 
which is relevant with regard to the defence of mental illness; the concept of mental 
illness; the defence of mental illness; and how mental illness is interpreted in criminal 
cases. A conclusion is then drawn to summarise the findings. 
2 Forensic psychiatry 
Forensic psychiatry operates at the interface of two disparate disciplines, namely law 
and psychiatry. Although most cases in forensic psychiatric practice produce little 
conflict, functioning at the interface of these two disciplines can lead to confusion and 
ethical dilemmas.4 Forensic psychiatry may be defined as follows:5 
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1  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 271. 
2  Arrigo Punishing the Mentally Ill 105. 
3  See Burchell 2003 Acta Juridica 23. 
4  Weinstock, Leong and Silva "Defining Forensic Psychiatry" 7. 
5  This definition of forensic psychiatry was adopted by the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry 
(ABFP) and the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (AAPL). See Weinstock, Leong and 
Silva "Defining Forensic Psychiatry" 7.  




Forensic psychiatry is a subspecialty of psychiatry in which scientific and clinical 
expertise is applied to legal issues in legal contexts embracing civil, criminal, 
correctional or legislative matters; forensic psychiatry should be practised in 
accordance with guidelines and ethical principles enunciated by the profession of 
psychiatry.6 
Most forensic psychiatrists do not see themselves as functioning outside of their 
medical and psychiatric roles. They see themselves (and probably generally are 
perceived) as utilising their medical and psychiatric skills and techniques.7 Controversy 
exists regarding to whom the forensic psychiatrist owes a duty. This problem is in part 
due to the fact that a standard doctor-patient relationship does not apply. Stone8 
believes that psychiatry enters an ethical morass when it leaves the clinical situation, 
as in the case of forensic psychiatry. This is discussed further below, when reference 
is made to the use of diagnostic criteria with reference to forensic settings. In order 
to fully understand the defence of mental illness it is important to discuss the concept 
of mental illness in the paragraphs below. 
3 The concept of mental illness 
Mental illness is a disorder (or a disease) of the mind that is judged by experts to 
interfere substantially with a person's ability to cope with the demands of life on a 
daily basis. It can profoundly disrupt a person's thinking, feeling, moods and ability to 
relate to others. Mental illness is manifested in behaviour that deviates notably from 
normal conduct.9 According to Bartol10 the word "illness" encourages us to look for 
etiology, symptoms and cures and to rely heavily on the medical profession both to 
                                                          
6  Also see Prins "Foreword" xi, who prefers to use the term "forensic mental health", because it 
reflects shifts in emphasis in a number of dimensions in the field of psychiatry. According to him 
there is an increasing recognition that work with mentally ill offenders needs to encompass a very 
wide range of disciplines if the many and varied needs of this group of individuals are to be met. 
This trend does not diminish the importance of psychiatry, but serves to recognise the many-
faceted elements in the challenges that offenders and offender-patients represent. The term 
"forensic mental health" would therefore then include, for example, law, management, psychiatry, 
psychology, social work and probation, as well as pharmacy. 
7  Weinstock, Leong and Silva "Defining Forensic Psychiatry" 9. 
8  Stone 1975 Am J Psychiatry 1125. 
9  Bartol et al Criminal Behaviour 228-229. 
10  Bartol et al Criminal Behaviour 228-229. 




diagnose and to treat. The term mental illness need not imply that a person is sick, to 
be pitied, or even necessarily less responsible than others for his or her actions.11 
According to the American Psychiatric Association12 no definition adequately specifies 
precise boundaries for the concept of "mental illness". This concept, like many other 
concepts in medicine and science, lacks a consistent operational definition that covers 
all situations. Mental illnesses have been defined by a variety of terms, such as 
distress, disadvantage, disability, inflexibility, irrationality, and statistical deviation. 
Each is a useful indicator for a mental illness, but none is equivalent to the concept, 
and different situations call for different definitions.  
Mental illness in a clinical context is defined as:13 
… a clinically significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs 
in an individual and that is associated with present distress (for example a painful 
symptom) or disability (for example impairment in one or more important areas of 
functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain disability, 
or an important loss of freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be 
merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for 
example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its original causes, it must currently be 
considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological, or biological dysfunction 
in the individual. Neither deviant behaviour (for example, political, religious, or 
sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental 
disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the 
individual…  
Mental illness in a legal context is defined as:14  
                                                          
11  A term that must be distinguished from mental illness is "mental retardation", which is 
professionally known as developmental disability. This is a cognitive deficiency measured by IQ 
tests (specifically, IQ below 70) which cannot be cured. It is a syndrome of delayed or disordered 
brain development evident before age 18 years. It results in difficulty in learning the information 
and skills needed to adapt quickly and adequately to environmental changes. See Ainsworth et al 
Understanding Mental Retardation 3. 
12  American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual xxi. 
13  According to the American Psychiatric Association the term "mental disorder" unfortunately implies 
a distinction between "mental disorders" and "physical disorders", which is a reductionistic 
anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling literature documents that there is much 
"physical" in "mental disorders" and much "mental" in "physical disorders". However, the problem 
raised by the term "mental disorder" has been much clearer than its solution, and the term will 
have to persist until an appropriate substitute is found. See American Psychiatric Association 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual xxi. Also see the definition of mental disorder according to ICD-
10: "a mental disorder is a clinically recognisable collection of symptoms or behaviour associated 
in most cases with distress or interference with personal functions. A deviant pattern of behaviour, 
whether political, religious, or sexual, or a conflict between an individual and society, is not a 
mental disorder unless it is symptomatic of a dysfunction in the individual". 
14  S 1 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 




… a positive diagnosis of a mental health related illness in terms of accepted 
diagnostic criteria made by a mental health practitioner authorised to make such 
diagnosis.15 
From a philosophical perspective, it is reasonably clear that there can be chronic 
mental malfunction when a person's capacities to respond to the world, to absorb and 
remember information, to respond with appropriate emotions and to form coherent 
plans are impaired. What is not so clear is whether the mind can be the self-contained 
locus of an illness, or whether mental malfunction should always be thought of as the 
by-product of physical or bodily illness or impairment. If the mind can be the self-
contained locus of an illness, then the mind might be cured by mental means, such as 
conversation with a therapist. If not, the only effective responses would be medical or 
pharmacological. Therefore the issue of what mental illness is has practical as well as 
purely philosophical importance.16 
Contrary to the concept of mental illness, "mental health" again is defined as the 
successful performance of mental function, resulting in productive activities, fulfilling 
relationships with other people and the ability to adapt to change and to cope with 
adversity.17 
Using the discussion of the concept of mental illness as a background, a discussion of 
the system of classification of mental illness now follows. 
4 System of classification of mental illness 
Diagnoses and classifications in psychiatry have undergone tremendous changes in 
the last 40 years. Before the 1950s diagnoses were not only unreliable, but the terms 
in which they were formulated even had meanings that varied considerably across the 
                                                          
15  Also see the definition of "severe or profound intellectual disability": "a range of intellectual 
functioning extending from partial self-maintenance under close supervision, together with limited 
self-protection skills in a controlled environment through limited self-care and requiring constant 
aid and supervision, to severely restricted sensory and motor functioning and requiring nursing 
care". S 1 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 
16  For interesting views of the philosophy of mental illness or health, see Gibson and Huemer Literary 
Wittgenstein 267; and further, Craig Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 314-316. 
17  Thompson Mental Illness 4. Also see the definition of "mental health status": "the level of mental 
well-being of an individual as affected by physical, social and psychological factors and which may 
result in a psychiatric diagnosis". See s 1 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 




world. By the end of that decade, "anti-psychiatrists", including Laing,18 and Szasz19 
had started to suggest that diagnosis and classification in psychiatry should be 
abandoned, together with the concept of mental illness.20 In the 1960s the World 
Health Organisation instigated a world-wide programme aimed at improving the 
diagnosis and classification of mental disorders, fostering research into the reliability 
of diagnosis and classification. The mental health section of the International 
Classification of Diseases is currently in its 10th edition (ICD-10).21 The American 
Psychiatric Association developed its own classificatory system, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM); the current classification, DSM-5-TR,22 
was published in 2013. 
An examination of a person with psychiatric or psychological problems begins with the 
attempt to recognise the individual pattern of symptoms and experiences that leads 
to the establishment of a specific psychiatric diagnosis. This diagnosis should be 
expressed in a particular nomenclature according to a recognised classification system. 
The fundamental purpose of diagnosis and classification in medicine is to define a 
group of discrete disease entities, each of which is characterised by a distinct 
                                                          
18  (1927-1989.) Ronald David Laing was a Scottish psychiatrist who wrote extensively on mental 
illness – in particular, the experience of psychosis. Laing's views on the causes and treatment of 
serious mental dysfunction (greatly influenced by existential philosophy) ran counter to the 
psychiatric orthodoxy of the day by taking the expressed feelings of the individual patient or client 
as valid descriptions of lived experience rather than simply as symptoms of some separate or 
underlying disorder. Often associated with the anti-psychiatry movement, he himself rejected the 
label as such, as did certain others critical of conventional psychiatry at the time. See Miller RD 
Laing 7, 19. 
19  (1920-.) Thomas Stephen Szasz is a Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry at the State University of 
New York Health Science Center in Syracuse, New York. He is a prominent figure in the anti-
psychiatry movement, a well-known social critic of the moral and scientific foundations of 
psychiatry, and of the social control aims of medicine in modern society, as well as of scientism. 
He is well known for his books: The Myth of Mental Illness (1960); and The Manufacture of 
Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement (1970), which 
set out some of the arguments with which he is most associated. See Slade Bibliography of Works 
1. 
20  The term anti-psychiatry usually refers to a movement that emerged in the 1960s, which is hostile 
to most of the fundamental assumptions and common practices of psychiatry. The term anti-
psychiatry was first used by the South African psychiatrist David Cooper in 1967. Two central 
contentions of the anti-psychiatry movement are that: (1) the specific definitions of, or criteria for, 
hundreds of current psychiatric diagnoses or disorders are vague and arbitrary, leaving too much 
room for opinions and interpretations to meet basic scientific standards; and (2) prevailing 
psychiatric treatments are ultimately far more damaging than helpful to patients. See Baker Mind 
Games 1-9. 
21  The ICD-10 is currently being reworked to ICD-11 but the process has not yet been finalised. 
22  TR stands for "text revision". 




pathophysiology and/or aetiology. However, for most psychiatric diseases the 
approach is based more on phenomenology than on pathophysiology and/or 
aetiology.23  
The two main current systems of classification in South Africa are the ICD-10 and the 
DSM-5.24 It is important to note that there are textual differences between ICD-10 
and DSM-5, but according to treaties between the United States and the World Health 
Organisation, the diagnostic code numbers must be identical to ensure the uniform 
reporting of national and international psychiatric statistics.25 ICD-10 is a uniaxial 
system which attempts to standardise by using descriptive definitions of the 
syndromes and operational criteria, as well as by producing directives on differential 
diagnosis. DSM-5 is a multiaxial system which relies on operational criteria rather than 
descriptive definitions. It states which symptoms need to be present (often quantifying 
their number and requiring a specific length of time for the symptoms to be present) 
as well as exclusion criteria.26  
A multiaxial system involves an assessment on several axes, each of which refers to a 
different domain of information that may help the clinician plan treatment and predict 
outcome.27 The use of the multiaxial system facilitates comprehensive and systematic 
evaluation with attention to the various mental disorders and general medical 
conditions, psycho-social and environmental problems as well as the level of 
functioning that might be overlooked if the focus were on assessing a single presenting 
problem.28 
  
                                                          
23  Pretorius "Classification" 7. 
24  Allan 2005 SAJP 55. 
25  Sadock and Sadock Synopsis of Psychiatry viii. 
26  Katona and Robertson Psychiatry at a Glance 11. 
27  American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 25. 
28  A multiaxial system further provides a convenient format for organising and communicating clinical 
information, for capturing the complexity of clinical situations, and for describing the heterogeneity 
of individuals presenting with the same diagnosis. In addition, this system promotes the application 
of the bio-psychosocial model in clinical, educational and research settings. American Psychiatric 
Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 25. 




5 Types of classification of mental illness 
Traditionally, mental illness is differentiated into mental retardation29 (learning 
disability, in which features of the disorder have been present from birth or an early 
age), personality disorder (usually present from childhood or adolescence), mental 
illness (where there is an identifiable onset of illness preceded by normal functioning), 
adjustment disorder (less severe than mental illness, occurring in relation to stressful 
events or changed circumstances), disorders of childhood and other disorders (those 
which do not fit into any other group, including behavioural disorders and substance 
misuse). Mental illness has traditionally been differentiated into organic and functional 
(psychotic30 and neurotic31) types.32 
For the purposes of this contribution, where the defence of mental illness is discussed, 
it is important to refer to the use of DSM in forensic settings, because the use of DSM 
in forensic setting might cause some problems as discussed in the paragraphs below. 
6 The use of DSM-5 in forensic settings33 
Misuse or misunderstanding of medical diagnoses should concern all physicians, no 
matter what the setting. The accuracy and reliability of psychiatric and psychological 
diagnoses in legal settings are particularly important, because diagnosis often 
                                                          
29  "Mental retardation", professionally known as developmental disability. This is a cognitive 
deficiency measured by IQ tests (specifically, IQ below 70), which cannot be cured. It is a 
syndrome of delayed or disordered brain development evident before age 18 years. It results in 
difficulty learning information and skills needed to adapt quickly and adequately to environmental 
changes. See Ainsworth et al Understanding Mental Retardation 3. 
30  Psychosis is defined as a severe mental disorder of organic or functional origin characterised by 
gross impairment in reality testing. The individual incorrectly evaluates the accuracy of his 
perceptions and thoughts and makes incorrect inferences about external reality, even in the face 
of contrary evidence. Specific symptoms indicative of psychosis are delusions, hallucinations, 
markedly incoherent speech, disorientation and confusion. Psychotic individuals have little or no 
insight into their symptoms and are so impaired that they cannot meet the usual demands of life. 
Goldenson Longman Dictionary "psychosis" 607. 
31  Psychoneurosis is a mild or moderately severe emotional disorder. It is sometimes simply called 
neurosis. The patient is able to lead a fairly normal life, but often suffers from feelings of 
depression, anxiety or inadequacy. Everyone experiences some symptoms of neurosis, particularly 
when under a strain. A neurotic person experiences these uncontrollable feelings frequently when 
there is no apparent cause. Neurosis is defined as an emotional or mental disorder accompanied 
by obsessional behaviour. Obsessions include excessive anger, anxiety or jealousy, or a phobia (an 
unreasoned fear of hatred such as agoraphobia), or an excessive fear of open spaces. See Reader's 
Digest Family Medical Encyclopaedia "psychoneurosis" 279; "neurosis" 238. 
32  Katona and Robertson Psychiatry at a Glance 11. 
33  This discussion is limited to diagnoses in forensic settings. 




influences court findings, financial judgments, the liberty interests of defendants, and 
even social policy. We therefore need the highest possible confidence level for 
diagnoses and other contributions in legal settings.34 The law does not set the 
threshold for determining clinical illness, but it does determine "what particular forms 
and degree of psychopathology it will recognise as exculpatory" or otherwise relevant 
to the court's needs. Individual behaviour and functioning are more important than 
diagnostic labels, although the psychiatrist or psychologist may have to convince the 
judge of that fact.35 
DSM-5 is a classification of mental disorders that was developed for use primarily in 
clinical, educational and research settings. According to the American Psychiatric 
Association36 there are significant risks that diagnostic information will be misused or 
misunderstood when the DSM-5 categories, criteria and textual descriptions are 
employed for forensic purposes. These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit 
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained 
in a clinical diagnosis. In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5 mental 
disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a mental 
disorder, mental disability, mental disease or mental defect. In determining whether 
or not an individual meets a specified legal standard, (for example, competence, 
criminal responsibility or disability), additional information is usually required beyond 
that contained in the DSM-5 diagnosis. This might include information about the 
individual's functional impairments and how these impairments affect the particular 
abilities in question. It is precisely because impairments, abilities and disabilities vary 
widely within each diagnostic category that the assignment of a particular diagnosis 
does not imply a specific level of impairment or disability. However, by providing a 
compendium based on a review of the pertinent clinical and research literature, DSM-
5 may facilitate the legal decision maker's understanding of the relevant characteristics 
of mental disorders. 
                                                          
34  Reid, Wise and Sutton 1992 Psychiatr Clin North Am 529. 
35  Diamond 1985 Bull Am Acad Psych & L 126. 
36  American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual xxiii-xxiv. 




According to Allan,37 when asked to give a diagnosis in legal settings practitioners 
should be mindful of the tentative nature of psychiatric diagnoses and that courts 
require that such a diagnosis must have scientific credibility. South African courts have 
not been explicit on how they determine the credibility of scientific evidence. 
Vorster38 argues that Allan appears to overstate the tentative status of psychiatric 
diagnostic categories by giving little weight to the large body of systematic research 
on which these diagnostic categories are based. Allan makes the point that the 
diagnosis must be generally accepted by other experts in the field. His comments, 
although valuable, are less pertinent to the South African context where the situation 
is quite different. In South African courts there are usually no experts available other 
than the one giving the evidence. Allan concedes in his article that the DSM contains 
disorders that are controversial. According to Vorster, the converse can also be stated; 
for example, that psychiatric disorders that may be pertinent are not included. Peer 
review and publication should be included. In South African courts these are frequently 
accepted with the presentation of a single source of reference discouraged. 
Fortunately case law is vital and the system of precedence is always followed. Allan 
fails to refer to the importance of this procedure. However, he makes the important 
point that making a psychiatric diagnosis is only the beginning of the task of a forensic 
psychiatrist. Vorster further states that if forensic diagnoses and assessments are to 
be reliable and credible, it is essential that forensic psychiatrists and not interfering 
relatives or legal representatives be in control of the psychiatric examination. 
Stevens refers to Sales and Shuman, who state that whereas diagnosis in clinical 
settings is an evolving phenomenon that the clinician can modify as therapy proceeds, 
a forensic assessment in most instances is a snapshot described on the witness stand. 
Finally, although the questions sought to be answered in clinical settings are defined 
by the clinician and the patient, the questions raised in the forensic setting are defined 
by the law without regard to their grounding in constructs that respond to clinical or 
scientific knowledge.39  
                                                          
37  Allan 2005 SAJP 52. 
38  Vorster 2005 SAJP 42. 
39  Stevens Role of Expert Evidence 55. 




7 The defence of mental illness  
7.1 Mental illness as a defence  
7.1.1 Fitness to stand trial 
Since 1977 the defence of insanity in South Africa has been governed by statute.40 In 
terms of section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act, an accused who suffers from mental 
illness or defect may as a result not be fit to stand trial.41 The enquiry into the capacity 
of the accused to understand the nature of the trial process is seen as a preliminary 
issue that has to be finalised before the issue of criminal responsibility for the conduct 
is examined. Burchell42 argues that this approach can severely prejudice an accused 
who has a defence to the charge or where the State has a weak case against him or 
her. The Criminal Matters Amendment Act43 addresses this problem. Section 3(b) of 
this Act provides that the court may order that such evidence be placed before the 
court so as to determine whether or not the accused committed the act. This enquiry 
can be initiated by the prosecution, the defence, or the court of its own accord. The 
court usually relies on medical evidence and must be satisfied that there is a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused lacks the capacity to appreciate the nature of 
the trial proceedings or to conduct a proper defence.44 Such a capacity to understand 
can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings.45 
                                                          
40  Ss 77-79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Also the Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters (RP 69/1967) (also called 
the Rumpff Report). 
41  S 77(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977: "(1) If it appears to the court at any stage of 
criminal proceedings that the accused is by reason of mental illness or mental defect not capable 
of understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence, the court shall direct that the 
matter be enquired into and be reported on in accordance with the provisions of section 79." 
42  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 372. 
43  The Criminal Matters Amendment Act 68 of 1998. 
44  The question of fitness to stand trial is determined by a psychiatric examination and report. Persons 
who are found not be fit to stand trial are detained in a mental hospital or prison until they become 
fit to be tried. See s 77(6) and s 77(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. For further 
reading, see S v Leeuw 1987 3 SA 97 (A) 17. In this case two psychiatrists, Prof WH Wessels and 
Dr PJ Gouse, reported in para [4] as follows: "Hy is weens verstandelike vertraging nie in staat om 
hofverrigtinge dermate te begryp dat hy sy verdediging na behore kan voer nie. … Hy was weens 
verstandelike vertraging ten tyde van die betrokke handeling nie in staat om die ongeoorloofdheid 
daarvan te besef of om ooreenkomstig 'n besef van die ongeoorloofdheid van die betrokke 
handeling op te tree nie. Hy is dus nie strafregtelik toerekenbaar nie." 
45  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 372. 




7.1.2 The test to determine criminal responsibility 
If the defence of insanity is raised, the test to determine the accused's criminal 
responsibility must be applied. This test is set out in section 78(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Section 78(1) reads as follows: 
A person who commits an act which constitutes an offence and who at the time of 
such commission suffers from a mental illness or mental defect which makes him 
incapable – 
(a) of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act; or 
(b) of acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his act, shall 
not be criminally responsible for such act. 
It is clear from the content of section 78(1) that the words "an act which constitutes 
an offence" do not refer to an offence for which the accused is liable, but only to an 
act which corresponds to the definitional elements of the relevant crime. 
It is important to note that since the decision of the court depends on the facts and 
the medical evidence of each case, Rumpff JA stated in S v Mahlinza46 that it is 
impossible and dangerous to attempt to lay down any general symptom by which a 
mental illness could be recognised as a mental "disease" or "defect". Therefore, for 
the purposes of the insanity defence in South Africa there is no formal definition of 
mental illness. However, the court held in S v Stellmacher47 that in order to constitute 
a mental illness or defect it must at least consist in: "[A] pathological disturbance of 
the accused's mental capacity and not a mere temporary mental confusion which is 
not attributable to a mental abnormality but rather to external stimuli such as alcohol, 
drugs or provocation." In S v Chretien the accused, after driving away from a party at 
                                                          
46  S v Mahlinza 1967 1 SA 408 (A) 417. 
47  S v Stellmacher 1983 2 SA 181 (SWA) 187. In this case the accused had been on a strict weight-
loss diet for a period of weeks and also performed strenuous physical labour on the day in question. 
He consumed at least half a bottle of brandy the evening. According to him there was in the bar 
a strong reflection of the setting of the sun in his eyes which shone through an empty bottle. As 
a result, he lapsed into an automatistic state, during which he began shooting at people in the 
bar, killing one person. The question was whether the accused had suffered from a mental illness 
as contemplated in s 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The state did not prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the conduct of the accused was indicative of a pathological disorder which 
is not due to a temporary clouding of the mind not attributable to a mental abnormality. A 
foundation was laid in the evidence for a reliance on lack of criminal responsibility not caused by 
mental illness. Bearing in mind the reasonable doubt which exists regarding the cause of his lack 
of criminal responsibility, the accused had to be given the benefit of the doubt. He was found not 
guilty and discharged. See Burchell Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 356. 




which he had been drinking, drove into a crowd of people, killing one and injuring five 
others. He was acquitted on the basis of his lack of intention due to his level of 
intoxication. The court, however, accepted that there were degrees of intoxication and 
depending on the extent to which an individual was intoxicated, his or her intoxication 
could impair either his or her intention, criminal capacity or the voluntariness of the 
conduct. Due to tremendous criticism with regard to Chretien’s being acquitted due to 
a lack of intention, the legislature enacted a special offence in the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1 of 1988 that made it a criminal offence when the level of the 
accused's intoxication was such that he or she lacked capacity.  
Furthermore, every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental illness or mental 
defect so as not to be criminally responsible in terms of section 78(1) until the contrary 
is proved on a balance of probabilities.48 Whenever the criminal responsibility of an 
accused with reference to the commission of an act or an omission which constitutes 
an offence is in issue, the burden of proof with reference to the criminal responsibility 
of the accused shall be on the party who raises the issue.49 
In terms of section 78(2), if it is alleged at criminal proceedings that the accused is by 
reason of mental illness or mental defect or for any other reason not criminally 
responsible for the offence charged, or if it appears to the court at criminal 
proceedings that the accused might for such a reason not be so responsible, the court 
must in the case of an allegation or appearance of mental illness or mental defect, 
and may, in any other case, direct that the matter be enquired into and be reported 
on in accordance with the provisions of section 79.50 
                                                          
48  S 78(1)(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
49  S 78(1)(B) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
50  Also see s 78(3-8) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977: " (3) If the finding contained in the 
relevant report is the unanimous finding of the persons who under section 79 enquired into the 
relevant mental condition of the accused, and the finding is not disputed by the prosecutor or the 
accused, the court may determine the matter on such report without hearing further evidence. (4) 
If the said finding is not unanimous or, if unanimous, is disputed by the prosecutor or the accused, 
the court shall determine the matter after hearing evidence, and the prosecutor and the accused 
may to that end present evidence to the court, including the evidence of any person who under 
section 79 enquired into the mental condition of the accused. (5) Where the said finding is 
disputed, the party disputing the finding may subpoena and cross-examine any person who under 
section 79 enquired into the mental condition of the accused. (6) If the court finds that the accused 
committed the act in question and that he or she at the time of such commission was by reason 
of mental illness or mental defect not criminally responsible for such act - (a) the court shall find 




In the case of S v Kavin,51 Kavin was charged on three counts of murder. He took a 
gun one evening and shot his wife and two children. When his sister asked him what 
was going on, he replied that it was only a car backfiring. His defence was one of 
insanity. An inquiry in terms of section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act was held. 
Kavin suffered from severe reactive depression super-imposed on a type of personality 
disorder displaying immature and unreflective behaviour. In the opinion of Dr Shubitz 
and Dr Garb it produced a state of dissociation. Both these psychiatrists as well as 
Prof Bodemer agreed that Kavin could not act in accordance with an appreciation of 
the unlawfulness of his act. They based their opinion on the basis of progressive 
depression. He was therefore not regarded as being criminally responsible for the acts 
in question. He was thereafter admitted into a psychiatric clinic in terms of section 
78(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
  
                                                          
the accused not guilty; or (b) if the court so finds after the accused has been convicted of the 
offence charged but before sentence is passed, the court shall set the conviction aside and find 
the accused not guilty, by reason of mental illness or mental defect, as the case may be, and direct 
- (i) in a case where the accused is charged with murder or culpable homicide or rape or another 
charge involving serious violence, or if the court considers it to be necessary in the public interest 
that the accused be - (aa) detained in a psychiatric hospital or a prison pending the decision of a 
judge in chambers in terms of section 29(1)(a) of the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act No. 18 of 
1973); (bb) admitted to, detained and treated in an institution stated in the order in terms of 
Chapter 3 of the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act No. 18 of 1973), pending discharge by a hospital 
board in terms of section 29(4A)(a) of that Act; (cc) treated as an outpatient in terms of section 7 
of that Act pending the certification by the superintendent of that institution stating that he or she 
need no longer be treated as such; (dd) released subject to such conditions as the court considers 
appropriate; or (ee) released unconditionally; (ii) in any other case than a case contemplated in 
subparagraph (i), that the accused - (aa) be admitted to, detained and treated in an institution 
stated in the order in terms of Chapter 3 of the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act No. 18 of 1973), 
pending discharge by a hospital board in terms of section 29(4A)(a) of that Act; (bb) be treated 
as an out-patient in terms of section 7 of that Act pending the certification by the superintendent 
of that institution stating that he or she need no longer be treated as such; (cc) be released subject 
to such conditions as the court considers appropriate; or (dd) be released unconditionally. (7) If 
the court finds that the accused at the time of the commission of the act in question was criminally 
responsible for the act but that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act or to act in 
accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act was diminished by reason of mental 
illness or mental defect, the court may take the fact of such diminished responsibility into account 
when sentencing the accused. (8) (a) An accused against whom a finding is made under subsection 
(6) may appeal against such finding if the finding is not made in consequence of an allegation by 
the accused under subsection (2). (b) Such an appeal shall be made in the same manner and 
subject to the same conditions as an appeal against a conviction by the court for an offence. (9) 
Where an appeal against a finding under subsection (6) is allowed, the court of appeal shall set 
aside the finding and the direction under that subsection and remit the case to the court which 
made the finding, hereupon the relevant proceedings shall be continued in the ordinary course." 
51  S v Kavin 1978 2 SA 731 (W). 




7.1.3 Panel for the purposes of enquiry and report under sections 77 and 78 
In terms of section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the court can refer an accused 
at any stage of the trial for a psychiatric or psychological assessment of his or her 
mental state with reference to either section 77 or 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
The Act distinguishes between offences that involve serious violence and those that 
are non-violent.52 The accused is usually admitted to a state psychiatric hospital under 
a warrant for a period of observation of 30 days. Effectively the court must appoint a 
panel of two or three psychiatrists if the alleged offence involved serious violence. The 
court has the discretion to appoint a clinical psychologist as well. The court may, for 
the purposes of the relevant enquiry, commit the accused to a psychiatric hospital or 
to any other place designated by the court for such periods not exceeding thirty days 
at a time as the court may from time to time determine, and where an accused is in 
custody when so committed, he or she shall, while so committed, be deemed to be in 
the lawful custody of the person or the authority in whose custody he or she was at 
the time of such committal.53 When the period of committal is extended for the first 
time under paragraph (a), such an extension may be granted in the absence of the 
accused unless the accused or his or her legal representative requests otherwise.54 
According to Kaliski,55 it is important to note that the critical first stage in any 
assessment is to determine whether the accused is suffering from a mental illness or 
whether there are other psychological or psychiatric factors that are associated with 
the terms of referral. The Criminal Procedure Act requires that mental illness or defect 
must be present before the question of whether the accused is fit to stand trial or 
                                                          
52  See s 79(1)(a)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977: "78 - (1) Where a court issues a 
direction under section 77 (1) or 78 (2), the relevant enquiry shall be conducted and be reported 
on - (a) where the accused is charged with an offence other than one referred to in paragraph 
(b), by the medical superintendent of a psychiatric hospital designated by the court, or by a 
psychiatrist appointed by such medical superintendent at the request of the court; or (b) where 
the accused is charged with murder or culpable homicide or rape or another charge involving 
serious violence, or if the court considers it to be necessary in the public interest, or where the 
court in any particular case so directs - (i) by the medical superintendent of a psychiatric hospital 
designated by the court, or by a psychiatrist appointed by such medical superintendent at the 
request of the court; (ii) by a psychiatrist appointed by the court and who is not in the full-time 
service of the State; (iii) by a psychiatrist appointed for the accused by the court; and (iv) by a 
clinical psychologist where the court so directs." 
53  S 79(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
54  S 79(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
55  Kaliski "Criminal Defendant" 110-111. 




criminally responsible can be examined. However, the courts will demand a variety of 
deeper insights into the accused and his or her behaviour. Consequently, it is good 
practice to conduct complete clinical examinations and to learn how to anticipate the 
court's requirements. 
With reference to S v Van As,56 the role of the expert witness is not to take over or 
replace the function or duties of the court. The court has to debate and decide on 
every fact.  
8 Conclusion 
This contribution has sought to provide an overview of some clinical aspects of 
psychiatry as well as an explanation of its functioning in forensic settings. It has further 
included discussion with regard to the classification and diagnosis of mental illness in 
clinical and forensic settings and provided an explanation of the concept of mental 
illness, which served as a background for the discussion on the defence of mental 
illness. 
It is clear from the discussion above that psychiatrists work to develop a valid and 
reliable body of scientific knowledge based on research. They apply that knowledge 
to human behaviour in a variety of contexts. In doing so they perform many roles, 
such as researcher, educator, diagnostician, therapist, supervisor, social 
interventionist and expert witness. Their goal is to broaden the knowledge of 
behaviour and, where appropriate, to apply it pragmatically to improve the condition 
of both the individual and society. They further strive to help mentally ill persons in 
developing informed judgments and choices about their treatment and behaviour.  
Psychiatrists are also important role players in the legal environment. As explained by 
Allan in view of the tentative nature of psychiatric and psychological disorders, it is 
imperative that practitioners remind themselves and legal practitioners that diagnostic 
constructs should be used with caution in legal settings, preferably only if the diagnosis 
satisfies the legal perception of scientific credibility. This means that at the very least 
the witness must be able to demonstrate that the disorder is generally accepted as 
                                                          
56  S v Van As 1991 2 SACR 74 (W). 




evidenced by its inclusion in a diagnostic manual and/or published peer reviews. Even 
then a diagnosis should be given only if the required diagnostic criteria are present. A 
competent witness should also have data on the other indicators of scientific credibility 
that may also be relevant, depending on the specific issues contested in the case.  
It remains a fact, however, that psychiatrists and psychologists encounter legal and 
ethical conflicts whenever they enter the courtroom. Their approach must not be 
simply diagnostic, simply ethical or simply legal. They must be able to translate their 
findings for the court, but these findings must come from clinical experience, not from 
some solely legal or ethical perspective. The legal system needs psychiatric and 
psychological knowledge about the interfaces of mental disorders, function and 
behaviour. However, after they have provided their opinions, the psychiatrists must 
leave the legal issues to the legal practitioners, and the final determination in relation 
to a defence of mental illness must be left to the judge.57 
  
                                                          
57  Reid, Wise and Sutton 1992 Psychiatr Clin North Am 529. 
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